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Pennsylvania and Supreme Court Libel Decisions: The
"Libel Capital of the Nation" Tries to Comply
Richard E. Labunski*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade states have struggled to comply with
Gertz v. Welch,' one of the Supreme Court's most important and
complicated libel cases. Second only to New York Times v. Sulli-
van2 in impact on libel law, Gertz granted states substantial discre-
tion to develop standards in several key areas. But the new stan-
dards had to be squared with the numerous rules the Supreme
Court continued to impose on states. This blending of the common
law of libel, nurtured for centuries in state courts, with the Su-
preme Court's "nationalization" of major aspects of libel, has pro-
duced complex, inconsistent and sometimes contradictory stan-
dards. The resulting rules often fail to adequately protect either
the first amendment or reputational interests.
Beginning with New York Times in 1964, the Supreme Court
began a decade-long effort to establish the first national standards
in libel. The creation of the public official and public figure catego-
ries of libel plaintiffs, and the requirement that such plaintiffs
prove actual malice, demonstrated the Court's determination to
provide greater protection to the press than was available under
the standard of "strict liability" that dominated state libel law.4
* Assistant Professor, School of Communications, University of Washington. B.A. 1975,
M.A. 1977, Ph. D. 1979 (political science), University of California.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For an excellent discussion of compliance by lower federal
courts, see Gruhl, The Supreme Court's Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower
Federal Courts, 33 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 502-19 (1980).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. See C.LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS: THE EVOLVING LAW OF LImEL
(1971) (a detailed examination of the evolution of state libel laws); see also R.E. LABUNSKI,
LmIEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE IN PRINT AND BROADCASTING
(1987).
4. In developing libel laws, the states applied varying attitudes, doctrines and prac-
tices in defamation actions, and most, if not all, demonstrated a zealous interest in prevent-
ing and redressing attacks. by the press upon the reputations of their citizens. Emerging
from the various state doctrines was the so-called rule of "strict liability." Until 1964, states
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The Court established a minimum standard of "fault" which the
states must observe;5 retained within its jurisdiction the standards
that would apply in cases involving public officials and public
figures;6 and allowed states to permit recovery of presumed or pu-
nitive damages only upon a showing of New York Times actual
malice.7 Yet the Court also made it clear in Gertz that the states
still had a very important role to play in determining such issues
as the status of the libel plaintiff, and if a private person, the ap-
propriate standard of liability.8
In a number of areas, the Supreme Court either directly charged
states with the responsibility of choosing an appropriate standard,
or left the issues sufficiently vague that states could assume their
own laws would govern. The issues which the Supreme Court
seemed to have left to the states include: 1) determining the status
of the plaintiff, i.e., whether a public official, public figure or pri-
vate person; 2) determining what standard of liability, such as ac-
tual malice, negligence or gross negligence would need to be met by
a private person plaintiff; and 3) determining what lack of care or
departure from accepted journalistic standards would satisfy the
were largely free to establish restrictive standards that warned publishers that they printed
materials susceptible of defamatory meaning at their own peril. So limited were the privi-
leges afforded the press, the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts in 1938 listed
truth (Section 582); consent (Section 583); and a very narrow conditional privilege based
upon a limited interpretation of the public interest (Section 598) as the only defense to the
publication of defamatory material. The Restatement made it clear that the conditional
privilege applied only when a substantial interest of the public was threatened. It specifi-
cally stated that the rule "does not afford a privilege to publish false defamatory statements
of fact about public officers or candidates for office," (Section 598, comment A) and "is not
intended to constitute an all-inclusive category of public interests which may be protected."
(Section 598, comment B). See Lee, Strict Liability Versus Negligence: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 1981 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. LAw REv. 398-406.
5. 418 U.S. at 347. See McNulty, The Gertz Fault Standard and the Common Law of
Defamation: An Argument for Predictability of Result and Certainty of Expectation, 35
DRAKE LAW REV. 51-100 (1986).
6. 418 U.S. at 342-43.
7. Id. at 349. The actual malice test is discussed below. Although the Supreme Court
expressed concern in Gertz and other cases about juries awarding "punitive damages in
wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused," id.
at 350, it has never said that punitive damages could not be awarded in cases involving
media defendants. Some states, such as Washington, have taken that step. In Taskett v.
King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash.2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976), the Washington Supreme Court
ruled that "under no circumstances will we allow a jury to award punitive damages." (em-
phasis in original). Id. at 447, 546 P.2d at 86. See Note, Mark v. Seattle Times: A Clarifica-
tion of Libel Law in Washington State, 18 WILLAmErE L. J. 695-706 (1982).
8. For a definition of a private person, see 418 U.S. at 344-45; for standards of liabil-
ity, see id. at 347. Most states have adopted a "negligence" standard in cases involving
private persons, although what constitutes negligence varies from state to state.
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negligence requirement, as long as states did not impose liability
without fault.,
The Supreme Court has left largely unanswered other important
questions, and only recently has settled a key area of libel law in
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,10 by holding that a private
person plaintiff has the burden of proof in cases involving issues of
"public concern." The Court has left unclear the extent to which
federal courts may impose their own standards on states that have
not yet determined the rules that will apply in cases involving pri-
vate plaintiffs; whether it intended to allow states to choose a
lesser standard of level of proof, i.e., "preponderance of evidence"
as opposed to "convincing clarity," in cases where the actual mal-
ice test applies;1" and jurisdictional issues relating to which state's
laws will govern in cases involving news organizations whose news-
paper or broadcast is circulated in more than one state."
Additionally, the Supreme Court has not yet defined the extent
to which states will be allowed autonomy to interpret federal con-
stitutional rights. In this era of "decentralization," when the Bur-
ger Court was determined to grant greater autonomy to the states
to interpret both their own and the federal constitutions, it re-
mains unclear how far the states may go. State reaction to their
increased independence has varied. Some have relied directly on
their own state constitutions to balance fundamental rights, while
9. Washington uses a "reasonable care" standard which the state supreme court de-
fined in Taskett: "We hold that a private individual. . . may recover actual damages...
on a showing that in publishing the statement, the defendant knew or, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that the statement was false, or would create a false
impression in some material respect." (emphasis omitted). 86 Wash.2d at 445, 546 P.2d at
85. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), where the plaintiff was a public official,
the Supreme Court tried to identify press conduct that would entitle the plaintiff to recover
for injury to reputation:
Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have
published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disre-
gard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
390 U.S. at 731. Justice Harlan, writing a plurality opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967), suggested that public figures, as opposed to public officials, could re-
cover for harm to reputation if they could demonstrate irresponsible conduct on the part of
the defendant: "[A] 'public figure'. . . may also recover. . . on a showing of highly unrea-
sonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155.
10. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
11. See 418 U.S. at 342. See also 376 U.S. at 285-86.
12. See Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Howser v.
Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1951).
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others have more boldly applied federal constitutional provisions
knowing that the Supreme Court is willing to tolerate state experi-
mentation to a greater extent than in the past. 3
The responsibility and discretion granted to the states in Gertz,
and the fact that vital first amendment issues are involved, make
all the more important an examination of the development of state
libel law in the post-Gertz era. While a number of states could
have served as a case study on compliance with Gertz, Pennsylva-
nia's experience is in some respects typical, while in other respects
unusual, and it provides evidence that the Supreme Court has
failed to provide sufficient guidance in cases prior and subsequent
to Gertz.
II. PENNSYLVANIA AS A CASE STUDY
For reasons that should please neither news organizations nor
those seeking to vindicate their reputations, Pennsylvania has be-
come, in the words of one observer, the "libel capital of the na-
tion."1 4 Libel suits are filed in the state at such a frenzied pace
that during the 46-day newspaper strike in 1985, for example, eight
libel suits were filed against Philadelphia's two daily newspapers.
A survey by Pennsylvania Associated Press Managing Editors
found that of 64 responses received from mailings to 107 daily and
154 weekly newspapers, 25 said they had been sued a total of 95
times in the last five years, 34 times by public officials.'"
The proclivity of Pennsylvanians to file libel suits is certainly
related to the Philadelphia Inquirer's aggressive reporting style. It
is a paper that has produced many award-winning investigative
pieces in recent years. Yet, the willingness of even public officials
to sue in Pennsylvania "at the drop of a hat," in the words of In-
quirer editor Eugene Roberts,' is also due to court decisions that
13. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Supreme Court
indicated that it would allow states greater autonomy to rely on their own constitutions in
deciding issues with federal constitutional implications. The California Supreme Court had
interpreted its constitution as granting access to private shopping centers for the purpose of
distributing literature and collecting signatures. In writing the Court's opinion, Justice
Rehnquist noted that even though the Supreme Court in previous cases held that the fed-
eral constitution would not force a privately-owned shopping center to provide such access,
the Court would allow such a finding if based on a state constitution. Pruneyard suggested
that states would enjoy more freedom to interpret their own constitutions even when faced
with challenges based on federal constitutional rights. See also Pear, State Courts Move
Beyond U.S. Bench in Rights Rulings, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1986, at 1.
14. Garneau, "Libel 'Epidemic,'" EDOR AND PUBLISHER, Nov. 9, 1985, at 14.
15. Id.
16. Id. See Bezanson, Libel Law and the Press: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA
Vol. 25:87
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are often unsympathetic to the first amendment claims of
journalists.
Pennsylvania's actions in the post-Gertz era also attracted the
Supreme Court's attention in the Hepps case decided in the spring
of 1986, which assigned the burden of proof to plaintiffs in cases
involving private persons, an issue of much importance to both
plaintiffs and defendants in libel suits.
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Between Gertz and Hepps, states were given few, if any, clear
instructions on the issue of burden of proof. It seems remarkable
that after the many libel cases decided by the Supreme Court be-
tween 1974 and 1986, such a fundamental issue would remain un-
resolved. Pennsylvania's struggle with the issue clearly demon-
strated that Gertz sometimes spawned contradictory and
inconsistent decisions in lower courts. Pennsylvania's experience in
developing a burden of proof standard was probably shared by
many states.
Gertz appeared to make constitutionally suspect Pennsylvania's
historic requirement that the defendant in a libel case prove that
the defamatory statements were true. The Supreme Court had ex-
pressed the concern in a number of opinions that if media organi-
zations were forced to defend the accuracy of every statement, the
effect would be so inhibiting that journalists would not be able to
function. 17 However, it was not until Gertz and the formal adop-
tion of the fault requirement that the Court strongly suggested
that an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests re-
quires that the burden be shifted to the plaintiff. 8
Yet, in the years following Gertz, it became clear that there was
L. REV. 215-33, (1985).
17. Some of the Supreme Court's most eloquent language on the history and role of
the first amendment is found in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-77.
18. The Court said:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. This approach pro-
vides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It
recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private indi-
viduals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.
418 U.S. at 347-48. Presumably, the publication or broadcast of a truthful statement can
never constitute fault. Therefore, because all libel plaintiffs, as of Gertz, have to prove some




still much confusion over the issue of burden of proof as Pennsyl-
vania's federal and state courts reached different conclusions. An
examination of pre- and post-Gertz Pennsylvania libel cases sug-
gests that state courts at first accepted the shift in the burden of
proof indicated in Gertz, but later rejected that interpretation in
favor of one more restrictive of the first amendment. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, which eventually resolved the issue in favor
of the plaintiff, had to decide what combination of state and na-
tional standards would apply.
In Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co.,19 decided three years before
Gertz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed the comprehen-
sive libel law passed by the legislature in 1953.20 Among its provi-
sions was the verbatim adoption of the Restatement of Torts
which specifically stated that the defendant had the responsibility
of proving the truthfulness of his statements. The Restatement
provided in part:
In an action for defamation, the defendant has the burden of proving, when
the issue is properly raised: a) The truth of the defamatory communication;
b) The privileged character of the occasion on which it was published; [and]
c) The character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as of public
concern.2
The state supreme court, in interpreting the Act, discussed the
relationship between truth and falsity:
[A]lthough ordinarily in order to be actionable words must be false, falsity
is not an element of a cause of action for libel in Pennsylvania. Rather the
opposite of falsity, truth, is a complete and absolute defense to a civil action
for libel . . . . And the burden of proving the same rests upon the defend-
ant. . . .Moreover, it is manifestly the fair thing to place upon the defend-
ant the burden of proving truth.22
The court expressed concern that it would be unfair to force a libel
plaintiff to "prove a negative," namely, that the defamatory state-
ment was false, and held that because the media defendant is more
likely to know whether or not the statements are true, it is "prefer-
able to place the burden of proof upon the party. . . who presum-
ably has peculiar means of knowledge of the particular fact in is-
sue."' The court gave an example:
19. 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1584a (Purdon 1970).
21. 441 Pa. at 450 n.6, 273 A.2d at 909 n.6, citing Restatement of Torts § 613 (1938).
22. Id. at 449-50, 273 A.2d at 908. (footnotes omitted.) (emphasis in original.).
23. Id. at 450, 273 A.2d at 908.
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[Ihf the written communication accuses plaintiff of being a murderess, a
burglar or a prostitute, the defendant knows precisely what particular event
he is referring to and the source of his information, whereas the plaintiff,
not knowing these facts, would experience great difficulty in refuting these
general charges by showing their falsity.24
Corabi was, of course, decided before the Supreme Court for-
mally adopted the fault requirement. After Gertz, Pennsylvania's
state and federal courts began to recognize that the new fault stan-
dard had to be incorporated into Pennsylvania law. In Steaks Un-
limited v. Deaner,2' 5 a 1980 case decided by the Third Circuit, the
court noted that the Corabi holding seemed to have been negated
by Gertz. The court stated that "Pennsylvania's placement of the
burden of proving the truth of the communication on the defend-
ant . . . would appear to be contrary to the constitutional limita-
tions on state libel law enunciated by the Supreme Court."2
But the court declined to make a definitive ruling, apparently
preferring that a Pennsylvania court put a formal end to the de-
fendant's burden of proof:
Inasmuch as the district court concluded that there exists a genuine issue
of fact regarding the truth of some of the broadcast material . . . and be-
cause the defendants have not challenged the decision on this appeal, we
have no occasion to review either the correctness of the district judge's deci-
sion or the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's placement of the burden of
proof. 
7
Two years later, the Pennsylvania Superior Court did find the
right occasion in Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers":
24. Id. at 450-51, 273 A.2d at 908-09. Justice White, dissenting in Gertz, made a simi-
lar argument. He claimed that the adoption of the fault requirement and the subsequent
shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff was an intolerable infringement on the right
of states to adopt standards to protect the reputations of private persons:
The Court, in a few printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law by de-
claring unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or
most of the 50 states. That result is accomplished by requiring the plaintiff in each
and every defamation action to prove not only the defendant's culpability beyond his
act of publishing defamatory material but also actual damage to reputation resulting
from the publication. . . .I assume these sweeping changes will be popular with the
press, but this is not the road to salvation for a court of law. As I see it, there are
wholly insufficient grounds for scuttling the libel laws of the States in such wholesale
fashion, to say nothing of deprecating the reputation interest of ordinary citizens and
rendering them powerless to protect themselves.
418 U.S. at 370.
25. 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 274 n.49.
27. Id. at 275.
28. 301 Pa. Super. 475, 448 A.2d 6 (1982).
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The practice in Pennsylvania has been to place the burden of proving truth
on the defendant, but the continued validity of this practice has been ques-
tioned . . . The common law rule has been that the defendant has the
burden of proving truth as an affirmative defense .... However, as noted
by the Third Circuit, the constitutionality of placing the burden of proving
truth on the defendant has been called into question by ...Gertz ....
Because the reason for placing the burden of proving truth on the defend-
ant is that falsity is presumed, it has been urged that the common law rule
does precisely what Gertz forbids: it hold a defendant strictly liable in a
case where truth cannot be proved.2 '
The court then made the decision to bring Pennsylvania law into
conformity with Gertz. The Dunlap court stated that "[g] iven this
state of the law, we have a choice. We might follow Corabi v. Cur-
tis Publishing Co., and hold that appellant as defendant has the
burden of proving truth. But we do not think we should do that
• ..we are persuaded that the plaintiff should have the burden of
proving falsity."80
Thus, eight years after Gertz, both Pennsylvania courts and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the notion that Gertz re-
quired the plaintiff to prove falsity. This made the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's Hepps decision all the more disturbing to those
concerned about the first amendment rights of media defendants.
On December 14, 1984, the state's highest court announced in
Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers1 that Gertz had not disturbed
the state's long-held requirement that the defendant prove truth-
fulness in libel suits, thus rejecting the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's Dunlap and the Third Circuit's Steaks Unlimited
decisions.
Maurice Hepps was the principal stockholder of a company that
franchised a chain of stores selling beer, soft drinks and snacks. In
a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer claimed that Hepps
had links to organized crime and that he used some of those links
to influence various governmental activities. For the purpose of the
29. Id. at 484-85, 448 A.2d at 11-12.
30. Id. at 485-86, 448 A.2d at 12-13.
31. 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984). See Note, Statute Requiring Defendant to Carry
Burden of Proving Truth of Defamatory Statements Does Not Violate First Amendment of
United States Constitution, 58 TEMPLE L. Q. 409-24 (1985); Note, The Validity of the Com-
mon Law Presumption of Equality in Light of New York Times and its Progeny, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 125-41 (1986); and Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Freedom
of the Press-Libel and Slander-Burden of Proof-as a Matter of Federal First Amend-
ment Law, a Private Plaintiff has the Burden of Proving the Falsity of an Alleged Defama-
tory Statement, 50 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 807-20 (1981).
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suit, he was considered a private person.3 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began with an underlying pre-
mise that goes to the heart of its Gertz interpretation, that is, the
principle that "any man accused of wrong-doing is presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty." Based on that premise, the court held
that "in actions for defamation, the general character or reputation
of the plaintiff is presumed to be good."33 The court then moved to
the next step. It held that "[s]ince the gravamen of defamation is
that the words uttered or written tend to harm the reputation, a
consequence of the rule presuming the good reputation of the
plaintiff was presumption of the falsity of the defamatory words.
'34
The court in Hepps recognized that the Supreme Court in Gertz
had expressed special concern about the ability of private individu-
als to defend themselves when defamed by news organizations and
said that such individuals were more deserving of recovery for such
harm. While it also recognized compelling first amendment inter-
ests, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed to cases as early as
1939 when it held in Summit Hotel v. National Broadcasting Co.3
that liability for defamation cannot be imposed without fault, and
that was interpreted to mean "negligence or willful misconduct.""
Thus, because mere falsity is not -enough for a private plaintiff to
recover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that requiring the
defendant to prove truthfulness sufficiently protected first amend-
ment interests.3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also asserted that because it
was Pennsylvania law under consideration in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia,3 8 decided three years before Gertz in 1971, the United
States Supreme Court had approved the state's placement of bur-
den of proof on the defendant and had recognized that the state
did not apply a "liability-without fault standard."39 Rosenbloom
32. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted, without addressing the issue, the trial
judge's determination that Hepps was a private figure.
33. 506 Pa. at 311, 485 A.2d at 378.
34. Id.
35. 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
36. Id.
37. 506 Pa. at 326, 485 A.2d at 386. The court wrote that
[a]s we understand the thrust of the Gertz reasoning, it would not offend the princi-
ples articulated therein to place the burden of proving truth upon a defendant as long
as the recovery is dependent upon the plaintiff's ability to establish the defendant's
willful or negligent conduct in publishing the defamatory matter.
Id.
38. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
39. 506 Pa. at 326, 485 A.2d at 386.
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involved a libel plaintiff who was clearly a private person, but who
became involved in a matter of public interest, namely the distri-
bution of allegedly obscene materials. A plurality opinion of the
Supreme Court held that even private persons caught up in mat-
ters of public concern must prove actual malice.40 This holding was
substantially modified in Gertz.1 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court apparently assumed that because the United States Su-
preme Court in Rosenbloom did not invalidate the state's "fault"
standard, it was tantamount to approving it.
The state court also pointed to Pennsylvania's strong shield law
protecting the right of news people to keep sources confidential
even in libel suits, as evidence that the plaintiff, denied access to
such information, is "restricted in his ability to prove the falsity of
the defamatory statement."42 It would be most unfair, the court
reasoned, to require the proof of falsity while at the same time de-
nying access to information that may be necessary to such proof:
"The defendant, who does possess that information is therefore in
a better position to prove the truth of the defamatory
statement." 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Hepps provided
not only a crabbed view of the first amendment rights of media
defendants, it demonstrated the ad hoc nature of state compliance
with United States Supreme Court libel decisions. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court had interpreted the state's libel statute in
Corabi to mean that falsity is not an element of a cause of action
for libel; yet, it must have recognized that the fault standard estab-
lished in Gertz had fundamentally changed the libel laws in all 50
states. Because the publishing or broadcast of a truthful statement
can never constitute fault, and fault must be proved by libel plain-
tiffs whether public officials, public figures or private persons, the
burden of proof must, therefore, fall on the plaintiff. The Pennsyl-
40. 403 U.S. at 52.
41. While the Supreme Court in Gertz did not directly overrule Rosenbloom, it sub-
stantially curtailed Rosenbloom's strong endorsement of first amendment rights by creating
the category of "private person" libel plaintiffs and holding that states may allow a lesser
standard than actual malice for such plaintiffs. 418 U.S. at 332-34, 346.
42. 506 Pa. at 328, 485 A.2d at 387. The Pennsylvania Shield Law, 42 PA.C.S. §
5942(a), provides that: (a) General rule.-No person engaged on, connected with, or em-
ployed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any radio or
television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, pro-
curing, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any
information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investiga-
tion before any government unit. (emphasis in original).
43. 506 Pa. at 328, 485 A.2d at 387.
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vania Supreme Court's rejection of the Gertz burden of proof stan-
dard meant that neither plaintiff nor defendant would know with
any certainty in advance of trial what evidence would be required
to win his or her case. It was left to the United States Supreme
Court to help Pennsylvania understand what it meant in Gertz,
and in the process, to provide in national standards more expan-
sive first amendment protection than would be available under
many state laws.
When the Supreme Court handed down Hepps, it was widely
applauded as a departure from the Court's more recent cases
favoring reputational interests.4 In a 5-4 decision, with Justice
O'Connor writing the majority opinion, the Court held that private
person libel plaintiffs must prove the falsity of the defamatory
statements if the issues involved are of "public concern."
The trial judge in Hepps had concluded that Pennsylvania law
required the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statements; in rul-
ing for the defendants, the jury held he had failed to do so. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had overturned the judge's interpre-
tation of state law and remanded the case for a new trial.
Justice O'Connor reiterated that Gertz had supplanted much
state libel law, and held that when speech is of "public concern but
the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the Constitution still
supplants the standards of the common law."'46 She added that
"[w]e believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the de-
fendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must similarly fall
here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the
burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering
damages."'4 6
Justice O'Connor recognized that in some libel cases, a jury will
be unable to determine definitively whether the statements were
true or false. In those cases, the burden of proof is dispositive. The
dilemma, Justice O'Connor noted, is that the allocation of the bur-
den of proof will determine liability for some speech that is true
and some that is false, "but all of such speech is unknowably true
44. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2939
(1985), involving a non-media defendant. See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979); Wolston v. Readers Digest, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979); Keeton v. Hustler 465 U.S. 770 (1984); and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), as
examples of Supreme Court decisions unsympathetic to first amendment claims of media
defendants. See Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Defamation-Public
Figures -Discovery-Editorial Process-Privilege, 18 DuQ. L. Rv. 719-33 (1980).




or false. ' 47 In a case where the court cannot determine how much
of the speech is true and how much is false, "we believe that the
Constitution requires us to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting
true speech." She concluded that "[t]o ensure that true speech on
matters of public concern is not deterred, we hold that the com-
mon-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand
when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for
speech of public concern. ' ' s
Justice O'Connor recognized that Hepps' burden was "weight-
ier" because Inquirer reporters invoked the state's shield law al-
lowing them to refuse to divulge the names of sources. She argued,
however, that because the trial judge did not give any instructions
to the jury on the issue of whether it could draw a negative infer-
ence from the refusal to name sources, the issue was not before the
Supreme Court. She also asserted that because a jury is more likely
to rule in favor of a libel plaintiff who demonstrates the falsity of
the defamatory statements, the Hepps case added only "margin-
ally" to the burdens a plaintiff must already bear as a result of
earlier defamation cases.49
In a dissent punctuated by language uncharacteristically harsh
for him, Justice Stevens argued that the majority view undermined
precious reputational interests:
[D]eliberate, malicious character assassination is not protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. That Amendment does re-
quire the target of a defamatory statement to prove that his assailant was at
fault. . . .I simply do not understand, however, why a character assassin
should be given an absolute license to defame by means of statements that
can be neither verified nor disproven20
The Supreme Court's Hepps ruling seems to have settled one
key area of libel law. Yet, many areas remain where the Court has
either provided conflicting or vague instructions, or has been frus-
tratingly silent on a key issue. Perhaps no issue is more important
than that of determining the status of the plaintiff. The decision
on whether the plaintiff must sue as a public figure or a private
person will strongly influence the outcome of the trial and subse-
quent appeals.5 1 By creating the public figure/private person test,
47. 106 S.Ct. at 1564. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1565.
50. Id. at 1568-69. Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White and Justice Rehnquist.
51. For two seminal studies, see Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of
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the Court has placed upon the states the very substantial burden
of interpreting its pronouncements on what actions a plaintiff must
take, and the nature of the controversy, before being designated a
public figure or a private person.5 2 Once a plaintiff is held to be a
private person, states must decide what standard to apply. In
Pennsylvania, courts have found making these decisions to be
rather difficult.
IV. PRIVATE PERSONS AND PENNSYLVANIA LAW: WHAT STANDARD OF
LIABILITY?
The Supreme Court specifically ruled in Gertz that the states
are entitled to substantial latitude in determining the appropriate
standard for cases involving private individuals, and they may im-
pose liability on a "less demanding showing than that required by
New York Times.""3 The actual malice test, first defined in New
York Times, applies to all cases involving public officials and pub-
lic figures.5"
While the Supreme Court retained the actual malice test for
public officials and public figures, it allowed states to choose for
themselves a standard for private persons. The Court, in fact, sug-
gested that the states have the discretion to adopt a standard more
favorable to first amendment interests than mere "negligence" or
some other minimum level of fault.5 5 But, according to a survey
Defamation Litigation, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455-500 (1980); and Franklin, Suing Media for
Libel: A Litigation Study, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 797-831 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
53. 418 U.S. at 348. See Naughton, Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited,
54 TUL. L. REv. 1053-93 (1980).
54. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court stated that:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
Id.
55. 418 U.S. at 347. The suggestion is derived from the very words used by Justice
Powell in formally adopting the fault standard: ". . . so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. (em-
phasis added). In establishing the fault standard in Gertz, the Court would most likely have
suggested an appropriate standard of liability if, in fact, it did not want to leave such a
decision to the states. In a long footnote to the passage cited above, Justice Powell took
issue with Justice White's dissenting view that the fault standard drastically "scuttle[s]" the
libel laws of all fifty states. In retreating from the extension of the actual malice test in
Rosenbloom to private individuals involved in matters of public interest, Powell suggested
that the standard announced in Gertz actually gave the states greater autonomy: "[Olne
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done by the Libel Defense Resource Center in New York, few have
chosen to provide such additional protection to media defendants
in libel suits. Of those which have chosen one standard of liability
over another, the great majority have chosen "negligence" to be
the standard in cases involving private defamation plaintiffs.56
State activity in this area vitally affects the rules under which libel
battles will be fought; a "negligence" standard would normally pro-
vide a plaintiff a much greater chance of success than would be
available under the New York Times actual malice test. 7
In its libel decisions from 1974 to 1979, the Supreme Court made
it clear that it intended for more and more plaintiffs to be classi-
fied as private persons.58 The Court had become concerned that
previous libel cases, requiring not only public officials and public
figures, but sometimes private persons as well, to prove actual mal-
ice, had unfairly favored media defendants.5 9 The Court balanced
such inequities by limiting public figure status to those who have
"thrust themselves to the forefront" of controversies to play some
role in resolving them.60 Thus, with more libel plaintiffs enjoying
private figure status, what states do in the post-Gertz era with re-
gard to the burdens on private persons will determine to a large
extent in whose favor first amendment and reputational interests
are to be balanced.
Pennsylvania's efforts to determine a standard for private per-
sons provide much insight into how states arrive at this important
might have viewed today's [Gertz] decision allowing recovery under any standard save strict
liability as a more generous accommodation of the state interest in comprehensive reputa-
tional injury to private individuals than the law presently affords." 418 U.S. at 347-48 n.10.
56. The Libel Defense Resource Center found in a survey conducted in 1984 that
twenty-five states had adopted a negligence standard for private person plaintiffs. 13 LDRC
Bulletin at 9 (March 31, 1985). New York has developed a standard for private persons that
is a compromise between mere negligence and actual malice. In Chapadeau v. Utica Ob-
server-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975), New York's highest
court identified "gross negligence" or "gross irresponsibility" as the correct standard in
cases involving private person plaintiffs involved in matters of public interest: "[Where the
content of the article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern, . . . the
party defamed. . . must establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that the publisher acted
in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information
gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." 38 N.Y.2d at 199,
341 N.E.2d at 571.
57. See, e.g., 6 LDRC Bulletin at 35-43 (March 15, 1983).
58. See Gertz v. Welch; Time, Inc. v. Firestone; Hutchinson v. Proxmire; and Wolston
v. Reader's Digest.
59. See New York Times v. Sullivan; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts; Associated Press
v. Walker (decided with Butts); and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.
60. 418 U.S. at 345 (to be discussed infra).
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decision. In Pennsylvania, the verdict now seems to be in: the state
supreme court asserted in Hepps that the standard for private per-
sons is negligence." However, in the decade between Gertz and
Hepps, Pennsylvania had the opportunity to grant greater first
amendment protection than that offered by mere negligence. That
it chose not to do so may be partially related to the way the deci-
sion was made, and it shows the sometimes strained relationship
between state and federal courts.
In 1971, six months after the United States Supreme Court's
splintered decision in Rosenbloom, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted the Rosenbloom plurality opinion in Matus v. Tri-
angle Publications2 The Pennsylvania court correctly interpreted
the plurality opinion as holding that private persons involved in
matters of "public or general" concern would be required to meet
the same actual malice standard as do public officials and public
figures." This "public interest" test focused on the status of the
controversy, namely, whether the issue was one of public impor-
tance, rather than on the status or actions of the plaintiff. 4 This
test was embraced by only a plurality in Rosenbloom and enjoyed
only brief favor in the Supreme Court. Still, the impact of Rosen-
bloom was felt in the states even after Gertz.
In rejecting the Rosenbloom public interest test, the Supreme
Court in Gertz held that states may require a lesser standard than
malice for private persons. Yet, after Rosenbloom, but prior to
Hepps, Pennsylvania courts continued to apply the public interest
test in Rosenbloom that required private persons involved in issues
of public importance to prove actual malice. The state's failure to
adjust its standards in the post-Gertz era created problems for not
only state courts, but federal courts trying to identify and apply
state law. In a 1982 case, Marcone v. Penthouse,6 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
61. To be discussed infra.
62. 445 Pa. 384, 286 A.2d 357 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. Writing for a plurality in Rosenbloom that included Chief Justice B4rger and Jus-
tice Blackmun, Justice Brennan discussed the relationship between the issue and the plain-
tiff: "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not 'voluntarily' choose to be become involved. The public's primary interest is in the
event. .. . We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied
in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all discussion and com-
munication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the
persons involved are famous or anonymous." 403 U.S. at 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
65. 533 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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noted the confusion caused by the failure to adjust state standards
to Supreme Court rulings:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to reconsider the Matus decision
in light of Gertz, causing our Third Circuit to describe Pennsylvania's stan-
dard of liability for suits brought by private figure plaintiffs as "unsettled."
Penthouse argues that the Matus decision is still good law and that applica-
tion to the public interest or concern test of Matus to the facts of the in-
stant case mandates that Mr. Marcone prove that the allegedly defamatory
communications were published by Penthouse with knowledge of their fal-
sity or reckless disregard for the truth. 6
The absence of state court action put federal courts in the diffi-
cult position of trying to guess what Pennsylvania courts would de-
cide on this issue. Eventually, federal judges, unable to determine
state law on the question of whether a private person must prove
actual malice or some lesser standard, decided to assume for them-
selves the responsibility of updating Pennsylvania law.
Judge Broderick, who wrote the decision in Marcone, acknowl-
edged that in trying to determine the appropriate standard for pri-
vate persons, he was influenced by the opinion of one of his breth-
ren four years earlier in Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers.17 In
that case, Judge Luongo, of the same federal district court, recog-
nized the discretion granted to the states in the wake of Gertz. He
said that "a state may, consistent with the Constitution, permit a
private individual to recover damages in a defamation action 'upon
a showing of mere negligence.' The issue here is whether Pennsyl-
vania has chosen to do so."""
The defendants in Mathis had argued that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in adopting the Rosenbloom plurality opinion in
Matus, had embraced the Rosenbloom actual malice standard with
"enthusiasm."69 But Judge Luongo disagreed, claiming that he
"discerned no enthusiasm at all for the Rosenbloom standard in
Matus." Quoting from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the
Matus case, he saw a court reluctantly agreeing to change state law
to satisfy the United States Supreme Court:
On the ... question of extending the reach of New York Times to matters
of public or general concern, there was no disagreement among the five
members of the Supreme Court who wrote or joined in opinions in support
of the judgment affirming the Court of Appeals. We therefore accept this
66. Id. at 360.
67. 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
68. Id. at 411 (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 411-12.
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modification of the law of defamation in Pennsylvania, and with it the co-
rollary that in such cases the reasonable care standard must give way to the
more stringent standard of [actual malice]. Specifically, we adopt as binding
on us the holding of the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom .... 70
Where in that statement Judge Luongo found a lack of enthusi-
asm on the part of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is difficult to
determine. He not only rejected the contention of the defendants
that the Matus ruling was still in effect in Pennsylvania, but he
proceeded, even in the absence of state court action, to all but
commit Pennsylvania to the negligence standard in cases involving
private persons:
When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is ultimately faced with the ques-
tion of whether a "private figure" plaintiff may recover for defamation
based on a showing of negligence, it will have to resolve that question by
drawing on the policies that traditionally have shaped the Pennsylvania law
of libel and slander. Although the common-law rule of strict liability is no
longer viable in light of New York Times v. Sullivan, I see no reason to
believe that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which is now free to aban-
don the Rosenbloom "actual malice" standard in "private figure" cases, will
choose to retain that standard. Nor have defendants pointed to any aspects
of Pennsylvania law that would support such a prediction. Accordingly, I
conclude that the Matus decision is no longer good law, and that a "private
figure" defamation plaintiff may recover under Pennsylvania law based
upon a showing of negligence.7'
Judge Luongo's opinion became a strong precedent that influ-
enced later cases. Judge Broderick, in refusing to accept the argu-
ment of Penthouse in the Marcone case, denied the magazine's
motion for summary judgment, citing Mathis as authority.
72
Perhaps it was only natural that the federal courts, in hearing
cases pursuant to their diversity jurisdiction, would fill the void
70. 445 Pa. at 395, 286 A.2d at 363. Interestingly, the court in Matus held that the
issue in that case was not a matter of public interest. A radio talk show host had criticized
on the air Raymond Matus, for charging his wife what was, in the host's view, too much
money to shovel the driveway. The court held that the talk show host's calling Matus by
name and his statement that "people like this, taking advantage of a woman at home alone
... shouldn't be in business," did not relate to Matus' involvement in an event of public or
general concern as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Rosenbloom. Id. at 395-96, 286 A.2d
at 365.
71. 455 F. Supp. at 412.
72. 533 F. Supp. at 361. In pertinent part, the court stated that:
[W]e endorse Judge Luongo's decision in Mathis concluding, as we do now, that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in light of Gertz, will retreat from the position taken
in Matus. Accordingly, we must reject Penthouse's argument that it is entitled to
summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Marcone cannot prove malice.
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left by the failure of Pennsylvania courts to determine in the post-
Gertz era the appropriate standard of liability. But the Supreme
Court had said in Gertz that as long as states require some level of
fault, they may adopt a lesser standard than actual malice for pri-
vate persons; it certainly did not say that it was mandatory.
The Pennsylvania courts decided in the wake of Rosenbloom to
require private persons involved in public issues to meet the actual
malice test. It seemed remarkable, therefore, that federal judges
sitting in the Pennsylvania districts would largely on their own ini-
tiative commit the state to a negligence standard. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court had not overruled Matus; therefore, federal
courts should have considered adopting a standard more protective
of the first amendment, as suggested by the state courts in the
wake of Rosenbloom, while waiting for the state's highest court to
adjust the standards. That the Pennsylvania Supreme Court even-
tually adopted the federal court's standard, one that was more re-
strictive of the first amendment, does not vindicate the usurpation
of state discretion by over-anxious federal judges.
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally got around to de-
ciding the issue in Hepps, it did so almost offhandedly, as if it had
long been settled:
It would appear that long before the First Amendment considerations were
raised, the common law of this jurisdiction had determined that the law of
libel should require negligence or willful misconduct. . . If a private figure
plaintiff is to maintain any cause of action at all, he must minimally estab-
lish the negligence on the part of the publisher.
7'
Although the United States Supreme Court in Hepps has not al-
lowed Pennsylvania the discretion to determine the burden of
proof in private person cases, the Court seems committed to the
public figure/private person test and thus is not likely to reverse
state court rulings that mere negligence provides the right balance
between first amendment and reputational interests in private per-
son cases. While the issue appears settled in Pennsylvania, many
states still have not found the occasion for determining the stan-
73. The Supreme Court did intend to give appeals courts substantial latitude in libel
cases and took the unusual step of saying that appeals courts may conduct an independent
review of the evidence because of the fundamental first amendment interests involved. Bose
Corporation v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). An appeals court is normally lim-
ited to a review of court procedure and does not independently gather and reassess evi-
dence. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit Court of Appeals compares with other
circuits in libel cases, see 13 LDRC Bulletin at 16-18 (March 31, 1985).
74. 504 Pa. at 323, 485 A.2d at 384.
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dard for private person plaintiffs, and there is a possibility that of
those that have yet to make the decision, some may provide more
protection to the media than is available under a mere negligence
standard.75
V. THE "PUBLIC FIGURE/PRIVATE PERSON" TEST IN
PENNSYLVANIA
The Supreme Court attempted in its opinions from Gertz in
1974 to Wolston v. Readers Digest76 in 1979 to provide guidance
for lower courts as they decide who is a public figure and who is a
private person. Yet, the Supreme Court has been unable to enunci-
ate clear standards, except to suggest that states further narrow
the categories of individuals considered to be public figures.
In Gertz, Justice Powell defined a public figure as an individual
who had actively sought notoriety:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involun-
tary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who
attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-
lar controversies in order to influence the resolution of issues involved. In
either event, they invite attention and comment.
77
The Court further "clarified" the definition of a public figure in
the Firestone case two years later, rejecting the notion that those
involved in highly-publicized litigation are no longer private
persons:
Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of
society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust her-
self to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influ-
ence the resolution of issues involved in it. Petitioner [Time Magazine] con-
tends that because the Firestone divorce was characterized by the Florida
Supreme Court as a "cause cel~bre," it must have been a public controversy
and respondent must be considered a public figure. But in doing so peti-
tioner seeks to equate "public controversy" with all controversies of interest
to the public.
78
75. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Franklin and Bussel, What
does 'Negligence' Mean in Defamation Cases? 25 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REV. 825-89
(1984). (Vol. 25 is devoted entirely to libel and the first amendment).
76. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
77. 418 U.S. at 345.
78. 424 U.S. at 453-54.
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The Gertz and Firestone definitions of public figures put the
states in a difficult position. Some individuals who had attained
notoriety, but had not "thrust" themselves to the forefront of a
particular issue, nevertheless were designated by states as public
figures on the basis that the issue was a matter of public interest.
By focusing on the actions of the plaintiff, rather than the status of
the issue, the Supreme Court placed states in the awkward posi-
tion of applying a "covert" two-step test which resurrected the
"public interest" standard of Rosenbloom that was rejected in
Gertz.79 This meant that standards among states in choosing which
plaintiffs will be public figures and which will be private persons
varied greatly.
In Pennsylvania, the judge has the responsibility of determining
whether the plaintiff is a public official, public figure or private
person. Because the standard of liability varies by category, the
decision by the judge as to the status of the plaintiff is one of the
most important decisions made in a libel case. The following per-
sons have been held to be public officials in Pennsylvania:80
Police officers in Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. in 198281; and in
Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. in 1980.81
Former chairman of the Delaware River Port Authority in Pierce v. Capital
Cities Communications, Inc. in 1978.3
United States Navy civilian employee working as a supervisory contract ne-
gotiator at a Navy ships parts control center in Rusack v. Harsha in 1978.84
Candidate for judge in Kubert v. Philadelphia Bar Association in 1974.11
The following persons have been held to be public figures:
Well-known entertainer with access to the media in Corabi v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. in 1971.86
Former professional football player in Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football
Club in 1979.87
Well-known local singer who voluntarily posed as a Playboy model, for the
limited purpose of her role in Playboy Magazine in Vitale v. National Lam-
79. See infra note 96.
80. This list is not exhaustive, but is illustrative of the types of cases in which Penn-
sylvania judges have had to determine the status of the plaintiff. It does not include cases
discussed elsewhere in more detail, such as Hepps.
81. 301 Pa. Super. 475, 448 A.2d 6 (1982).
82. 281 Pa. Super. 588, 422 A.2d 625 (1980).
83. 576 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1978).
84. 470 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
85. 229 Pa. Super. 674, 325 A.2d 632 (1974).
86. 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
87. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
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poon, Inc. in 1978.18
President of a taxicab company who voluntarily involved himself in a public
debate regarding fare increases in Fram v. Yellow Cab Company of Pitts-
burgh in 1974.8 9
Directors of a non-profit organization which treated brain-injured children
in Doman v. Rosner in 1977.0
The following persons have been held to be private persons:
Lawyer who represented individuals on drug charges and who was indicted
on drug charges in Marcone v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd. in 1982.11
Individual who participated in Mummers' costume parade in Martin v. Mu-
nicipal Publications in 1981.
92
Person who represented himself as a charitable fundraiser in Hanish v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. in 19 8 0 .
93
As mentioned above, in Marcone, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that a
lawyer who had represented individuals charged with drug offenses
and who had been indicted on drug charges himself was a private
person. After reviewing Gertz, Judge Broderick seemed to closely
pattern his ruling after the Supreme Court's decision in that case:
This record is devoid of evidence that Mr. Marcone is an individual who has
achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that he has become a public fig-
ure for all purposes and in all contexts .... It is clear that Mr. Marcone's
representation of private individuals on drug charges and his own indict-
ment on such charges does not evidence an attempt on his part to engage
the public's attention, or to thrust himself into the vortex of the controversy
giving rise to the defamation, or to influence its outcome."
In Hanish v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. in 1980, the same
Judge Broderick employed a covert "public interest" test, rather
than a test based merely on the actions of the plaintiff. The court
needed to determine the status of an individual who had been en-
gaged in fundraising and was accused in a television broadcast of
selling, for his own profit, items meant for charity. Judge Broder-
ick, in citing Firestone, seemed to assert that because fundraising
is not a public controversy, the plaintiff should not be considered a
public figure.'8
88. 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
89. 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
90. 246 Pa. Super. 616, 371 A.2d 1002 (1977).
91. 533 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
92. 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
93. 487 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
94. 533 F. Supp. at 359-60.
95. 487 F. Supp. at 403. In pertinent part, Judge Broderick stated that, "This Court
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Judge Broderick quoted the section of Firestone dismissing
Time's contention that Mrs. Firestone's divorce was a public con-
troversy: "In so doing [defendant] seeks to equate public contro-
versy with all controversies of interest to the public. Were we to
accept this reasoning, we would reinstate the doctrine advanced in
Rosenbloom." Judge Broderick seemed to have first decided that
fundraising is not such a public controversy and thus the plaintiff
could not be a public figure.96
agrees with plaintiff that, on the basis of this record, he should not be deemed a public
figure. Defendant argues that plaintiff, in connection with his charitable fundraising activi-
ties, naturally became the subject of press attention. This Court must reject this
contention."
96. Judge Broderick's reliance on Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), raises
the question of whether the Supreme Court in that case, and Judge Broderick in Hanish,
actually employed a two-step test that was supposedly rejected by the Court in Gertz. To
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Firestone, Mrs. Firestone was clearly a public figure and not
a private person. 424 U.S. at 485. Justice Marshall also raised the issue of whether the
majority in Firestone, having rejected the public interest test in Rosenbloom in favor of a
public figure/private person test in Gertz, simply ignored or circumvented the very tests it
had just established. The majority in Firestone concluded that the subject matter of the
alleged defamation, her divorce, was not a "public controversy" as that term was used in
Gertz. Considering the attention that Mrs. Firestone and her lawsuit had attracted, it was
hard for Justice Marshall to understand what the term "public controversy" meant. "The
only explanation I can discern from the Court's opinion is that the controversy was not of
the sort deemed relevant to the 'affairs of society,' and the public's interest not of the sort
deemed 'legitimate' or worthy of judicial recognition." 424 U.S. at 487. To Justice Marshall,
that is precisely what Gertz was intended to avoid. The Court did not want to force state
and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which issues are of general or public interest
and which are not; to determine, in other words, "what information is relevant to self-gov-
ernment." If Gertz, therefore, is to have any meaning at all, in Justice Marshall's view, the
"focus of the analysis must be on the actions of the individual, and the degree of public
attention that had already developed, or that could have been anticipated, before the report
in question." 424 U.S. at 489.
If Justice Marshall is correct in suggesting that the Court first made the determination
that Mrs. Firestone's divorce was not a matter of public interest, and then secondarily de-
cided that she was not a public figure, then it is apparent that the Court created a public
figure/private person test from which it was willing to deviate while, at the same time, pre-
tending that the test was still in effect. Gertz and Firestone seem to indicate that in order
for someone to be considered a public figure, the controversy in which they are involved
must first pass a "covert" public interest test, similar to the test too quickly discarded by
the Court majority in Gertz after its adoption in Rosenbloom.
One observer argued that once the Court determined that discussion of Mrs. Firestone's
divorce was not deserving of first amendment protection, it would follow that she would be
considered a private and not a public person: "The result in Firestone indicates that the
Court actually will not subjugate reputational interests-even those of arguably public
figures-to what it considers weak or nonexistent first amendment interests.... By defin-
ing the controversy ...as the divorce itself. . . [and] ...by carefully categorizing and
labeling her actions in that controversy, the Court could deny that she had injected herself
into it voluntarily." Prager, Public Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REv. 175-76
(1977).
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In Martin v. Municipal Publications, the same district court
held that a man participating in the "Mummer's" parade was a
private person because he had not voluntarily interjected himself
into a public controversy. In 1979, Philadelphia Magazine pub-
lished a photograph of plaintiff Joseph Martin in his Mummer's
costume without his permission. The photograph was accompanied
by a humorous but unflattering caption. 7 Among other things, the
defendant argued that Martin was a public figure and must
demonstrate actual malice. The court rejected that contention on
several grounds, among them being the facts that the plaintiff was
not famous and had not thrust himself into the forefront of a pub-
lic controversy.98
In Martin the defendant had requested summary dismissal, but
the judge held that even if Martin had been considered a public
figure, he would not be able to grant the motion. The defendant
conceded that it had no basis to believe that the unflattering cap-
tion was true. The judge recognized such an admission as prevent-
ing the granting of summary judgment.99
In the absence of clear guidelines provided by the Supreme
Court, and because of state court decisions that sometimes appear
contradictory, it is often difficult to discern clear patterns that will
tell future litigants who will be designated a public figure and who
a private person. Often, both sides will not know in advance which
way the trial judge will rule on that very important question. Some
decisions of the state and federal courts in Pennsylvania designat-
ing both well-known and lesser-known individuals to be limited-
purpose public figures demonstrates that they are sometimes will-
ing to assign public figure status to those who might ordinarily be
considered private persons under a strict interpretation of Gertz.
In Corabi, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no trouble de-
termining that a well-known entertainer was a public figure. The
Saturday Evening Post had published on October 26, 1963, what
was purported to be the life story of Lillian Reis (Corabi). The
97. 510 F. Supp. at 257. The photograph bore the following caption:
"Dead animal of the month.
A New Year's tribute here to all the ostriches who gave their tails to make the world
free for closet transvestites from South Philly to get themselves stinking drunk. Have
a nice year."
98. 510 F. Supp. at 258.
99. Id. at 259. The court stated: "[D]efendant apparently concedes not only that the
information included in the caption below Mr. Martin's picture was not accurate but also
that the magazine was aware of this inaccuracy prior to publication. I find accordingly that
Philadelphia Magazine has failed to show that it is entitled to summary judgment.
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court noted that she was a professional entertainer in the Philadel-
phia area who had gained widespread public attention "after she
was charged with having masterminded a large burglary allegedly
committed in Pottsville, Pennsylvania. '" 100 In holding that she was
a public figure, the court examined previous Supreme Court deci-
sions that held that having "sufficient access to counterargument"
is one characteristic of a public figure. 101 Just after the article was
published, Reis was interviewed on a popular radio talk show and
she had the opportunity to refute some of the charges made in the
article.102
In Fram v. Yellow Cab Company of Pittsburgh in 1974, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsyl-
vania held that a president of a taxicab company was a public fig-
ure in his libel suit against the counsel of a competing taxi com-
pany who allegedly defamed him on a television news program.
Citing Gertz, the court held that Fram had voluntarily become in-
volved in a public controversy:
Fram's activities are clearly distinguishable from those of Gertz; it is evi-
dent that Fram intentionally sought the press and the media to publicize
his criticism of Yellow Cab's rate increase. . . . Fram appeared before Pitts-
burgh's City Council to petition its support in forcing the P.U.C. to hold
public hearings on Yellow Cab's fare hike. During Fram's appearance before
City Council and again in his appearance on "Newsroom" . . . Fram has
thrust his person into the "vortex" of a public controversy.1° 3
Four years later in Vitale v. National Lampoon, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that a singer who voluntarily posed for "nude and seminude" pho-
tographs which were published by Playboy Magazine, then in an-
other magazine poking fun at Playboy, was a public figure:
Plaintiff. .. both consented to and received payment for their publication.
She obviously sought international circulation of her photographs and her
100. 441 Pa. at 457-58, 273 A.2d at 912.
101. See, e.g., the Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker (decided together), holding that the fact that Butts and Walker both had
access to channels of communication to refute the defamatory charges was a factor:
[B]oth Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of independent public
interest at the time of the publications; both, in our opinion, would have been labeled
'public figures' under ordinary tort rules .... Both commanded sufficient continuing
public interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able
to 'expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory
statements.
388 U.S. at 154-155.
102. 441 Pa. at 457 n.15, 273 A.2d at 912 n.15.
103. 380 F. Supp. at 1334.
Pennsylvania Libel
expectations were fulfilled .... Her position is clearly distinguishable from
the situation presented in Time, Inc., v. Firestone, upon which she relies
... .Plaintiff voluntarily placed herself in the public domain in the role of
a Playboy model, inviting attention and comment.It 4
The parody in National Lampoon followed the format for adver-
tisements used in Playboy, which depicts the Playboy reader as a
"well-to-do gentleman accompanied by two or more beautiful
women." But National Lampoon's spoof on Playboy did not fea-
ture one of the "beautiful people." The court, rather than merely
describing the ad in Lampoon, attached it as an exhibit, providing
a rare display of judicial humor. It was stated that in order "[t]o
spare ourselves the literary voyage.., which would be required to
describe the picture, we have appended a copy to this opinion so
the reader may share the euphoria of this unique aesthetic experi-
ence without the unwelcome intervention of an interpreter. ' 10 5 The
court overruled the objections of the plaintiff and determined that
she was a limited-purpose public figure.
The directors of an institute which dealt with brain-injured chil-
dren were held to be public figures by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Doman v. Rosner in 1977. The plaintiffs sued a professor
of psychology who had become associated with the institute and
had prepared a report on an institute project. The court had no
trouble determining the plaintiffs to be public figures. The work of
the institute was of "immense public interest" and the Governor of
Pennsylvania had discussed its work when he proclaimed the week
of October 14, 1967, to be "Achievement of Human Potential
Week." The judge noted that the plaintiffs' names and positions
appeared in many of the articles written about the institute and
that they had made many speeches and written several books and
articles.10 6 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, seemed to be
less persuaded in Hutchinson v. Proxmire that such visibility qual-
ifies a plaintiff for public figure status.1 0 7
104. 449 F. Supp. at 445 (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 443. The photograph shows a magazine on the floor of a bathroom stall; two
sneaker-covered feet and pants are visible. The caption says in part:
WHAT SORT OF MAN READS PL*YB*Y? A young man in touch with himself
and his own imagination. Self-reliant, and with an appreciation for his personal
privacy....
106. 246 Pa. Super. at 623, 371 A.2d at 1005-06.
107. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Supreme Court held that a
research scientist who had been criticized in a press release and speech by Senator William
Proxmire was a private person. At the time Hutchinson was given Proxmire's "Golden
Fleece" award, he was director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital. He had
received about half a million dollars in research money from several federal agencies during
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As the above cases indicate, judges seem willing to assign public
figure status even when the plaintiff's participation in the contro-
versy at hand hardly seems voluntary. Although the Court in Gertz
said that incidences of involuntary public figures would be "ex-
ceedingly rare," the cases discussed here suggest that trial judges
look not only at the actions of the plaintiff, but at the nature of
the controversy as well, in determining the status of the plaintiff.
Such an approach is similar to the now discredited public interest
test in Rosenbloom and suggests that in the wake of Gertz, trial
judges are applying a "covert" public interest test while still pay-
ing homage to Gertz and Firestone.
VI. A "COVERT" PUBLIC INTEREST TEST AND TAMPERING WITH THE
LEVEL OF PROOF IN ACTUAL MALICE CASES
Perhaps Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts set the precedent
for all those involved in professional sports, because in Chuy v.
Philadelphia Eagles,108 decided by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit sitting en banc, the court ruled that a
former professional football player who had been involved in a
well-publicized trade and whose contractual dispute with the foot-
ball team was a matter of public knowledge was a public figure.
The court maintained that:
Professional athletes, at least as to their playing careers, generally assume a
position of public prominence. Their contractual disputes, as well as their
athletic accomplishments, command the attention of sports fans. Chuy, in
particular, was a starting player .... He had gained special prominence for
being involved in a major and well-publicized trade .... 09
The court then noted the difference between Chuy and Mrs.
the preceding seven years. Before working at the Kalamazoo hospital, Hutchinson had held
a position at another facility operated by the Michigan State Department of Mental Health.
When he became research director at The Foundation for Behavioral Research, the federal
funds he had been receiving were transferred to the foundation. 443 U.S. at 114-15.
In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that Hutchinson, by
accepting federal research funds and publishing his research findings, had thrust himself
into a public controversy. Id. at 135-36. Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion,
was not certain that Proxmire had even designated a "public controversy"; at best, it was a
concern about general public expenditures:
But that concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures; it is
not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure. If it were, everyone who received or
benefited from the myriad public grants for research could be classified as a public
figure-a conclusion that our previous opinions have rejected.
Id. at 135.
108. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 1280.
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Firestone:
We believe that Chuy's public prominence was a good deal more marked
than the status of the plaintiff in Time v. Firestone. The former Mrs. Fire-
stone was found not to have attained a role of prominence in affairs of soci-
ety and her divorce action was deemed not a public controversy. Although
the marital troubles of the wealthy do not make them public figures, a pro-
fessional athlete's contractual troubles relating to his playing performance
commands the attention of a more sustained and wider public audience." 0
The court's statements seemed to suggest once again that the
issue considered first in determining the status of the libel plaintiff
is the nature of the controversy. Because Chuy participated in an
activity, namely professional football, that attracted a lot of atten-
tion, he was considered to be a public figure. Mrs. Firestone's di-
vorce, on the other hand, was not a public controversy and there-
fore she was a private person. If, in fact, courts apply a covert
public interest test before determining the status of the plaintiff,
then it is difficult to see how such a two-step examination differs
from the discredited public interest test in Rosenbloom. Judges
still seem to be deciding which issues are matters in which the
public has a legitimate interest, and therefore deserving of first
amendment protection, and which are not. Only after the first step
is passed do the courts move to the second step of determining if
the plaintiff is a public figure. That is the precise quagmire which
Gertz was supposed to eliminate.
If the two-step test is applied literally, lower courts would be
able to determine first, that no public controversy exists and,
therefore, that no first amendment interests are at stake. If no first
amendment interests are at stake, reputational interests can pre-
vail. In such a case the controversy does not involve the balancing
of reputational interests against precious first amendment free-
doms. If the Gertz public figure test is, as was suggested by the
Supreme Court, devoid of any determinations of the public inter-
est, then it assigns a constant weight to the first amendment side
of the scales. That side theoretically remains weighted whether or
not the subject is a matter of public interest, because the focal
point is the actions taken by the plaintiff and not the nature of the
controversy. The result may be that public figures who cannot
prove actual malice and private persons who cannot prove negli-
gence may be sacrificed to less than compelling first amendment




That may have been what happened in the Chuy case. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that the public has a more compelling interest in
the activities of professional athletes in their contractual disputes
than in the role that wealthy and prominent individuals play in
society. It is most paradoxical that libel standards have developed
that grant the media substantial protection to cover the problems
of professional athletes and much less protection in their coverage
of individuals who, even without holding public office, may be im-
portant in influencing the affairs of government and society. It ap-
pears that lower courts, in attempting to apply Gertz and Fire-
stone, have followed the Supreme Court's lead in developing the
two-step test and thus continue to decide which issues constitute
public controversies. Such an evolution of libel laws would proba-
bly have startled one commentator who might not understand how
Chuy's contractual and health problems have been granted the
same status as issues of "governing importance.""' 2
In Chuy, the United States Court of Appeals had an opportunity
to clarify another important issue relating to the level of proof re-
quired in libel cases. The Supreme Court in New York Times not
only created the actual malice test for public officials, it also ruled
that the level of proof would not be mere "preponderence of evi-
dence," the usual standard in civil suits, but "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence, a standard the Court considered to be more protec-
tive of first amendment interests." 3
Three years after requiring public officials to prove actual malice
111. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
112. Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the people created a form of government
under which they granted only some powers to the federal and state instruments they estab-
lished; they reserved significant powers of government to themselves. These reserved pow-
ers, which Meiklejohn called of "governing importance," are concerned not with a private
right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility. In his view, freedom of ex-
pression relating to issues of public affairs is an absolute:
Public discussion of public issues, together with the spreading of information and
opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our agents.
Though they govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our governing, they
have no power. Over their governing, we have sovereign power.
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, SUP. CT. REv. 257 (1961).
113. 376 U.S. at 285-86. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. In Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, - U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986), the Supreme Court extended such pro-
tection to the pre-trial stage where motions for summary dismissal are heard. The Court
held that a public figure must offer evidence of actual malice by "clear and convincing"
evidence if he is to avoid the granting of summary judgment for the defendant: "Just as the
'convincing clarity' requirement is relevant in ruling on a motion for directed verdict, it is
relevant in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." 106 S.Ct. at 2513.
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in New York Times, the Supreme Court extended the test to cases
involving public figures in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts"1 4
and Associated Press v. Walker.11 5 While the Court did not specifi-
cally state that public figures who must meet the same actual mal-
ice test as public officials would also have to do so with convincing
clarity, it may be assumed that if the Court wanted to change the
level of proof in cases involving public figures, it would have said
so. By extending the actual malice test to public figures, the Su-
preme Court retained within its jurisdiction decisions as to the
level of protection provided media defendants in libel suits involv-
ing public officials and public figures.
That view was not shared by Pennsylvania courts, which felt
that they could tamper with the level of proof in actual malice
cases. In Corabi, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania specifically
rejected the interpretation that public figures must prove their
cases by convincing clarity:
We do not agree. . . that the jury must be instructed that a public figure
plaintiff must prove "actual malice" by "clear and convincing" evidence
rather than by a preponderence of evidence. . . .[Wihile the existence or
absence of actual malice is a question of fact for the jury, whether there is
sufficient evidence in the case to warrant such a finding by the jury is a
question of law for the court and is reviewable on appeal. . . . We believe
that the. . . Court. . . was not addressing itself to the degree of proof...
but to the standard by which the court must review the evidence.' "
The actual malice standard, which has protected media organi-
zations when covering public officials and public figures, is diluted
when the level of proof required is lessened. The issue remains un-
settled even though the Third Circuit, in Chuy, conceded that the
"convincing clarity" standard probably applies to public figures;
yet, while the Third Circuit was aggressive in helping Pennsylvania
choose negligence as the correct standard for private persons, it
declined to end the apparent discrepancy between the Supreme
Court decisions and state court rulings on the issue of level of
proof. 117
114. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
115. Id. (decided with Butts).
116. 441 Pa. at 456-57, 273 A.2d at 911-12. In Gertz, the Supreme Court did state that
public figures must also prove actual malice with "convincing clarity": "Those who...are
properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for
injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth." 418 U.S. at 342.
117. 595 F.2d at 1281. The court provided:
Because Chuy is a public figure, this may require that he prove by "convincing
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It is not always immediately clear what issues will confront lower
courts in the wake of complex Supreme Court decisions. It may
take years before cases move through the appellate system to an-
swer the numerous questions that arise. But when an appellate
court has the opportunity to clarify apparent discrepancies be-
tween the Supreme Court and state courts, it should not follow the
road of self-restraint and "reserve a decision for another day," as
courts are fond of doing.118 It should make a decision one way or
the other so that plaintiffs, defendants and judges in libel cases
will know in advance what standards will apply. It does not seem
appropriate to leave "unsettled" a question as fundamental as the
degree of proof that must be met by public officials and public
figures.
The Supreme Court intended for the actual malice test to pro-
vide substantial protection to media organizations when discussing
the activities of public officials and public figures. While it has
struck a new balance between first amendment and reputational
interests by narrowing the categories of individuals who are consid-
ered public figures, it has not altered the degree of proof required
in cases where the actual malice standard applies. 119 Until the Su-
preme Court changes the level of proof in cases involving public
officials and public figures, or specifically allows states greater au-
tonomy in this key area, the states should not take it upon them-
selves to choose an interpretation that is less accommodating to
fundamental first amendment interests. It can be argued that the
actual malice test places an intolerable burden on even the public
official or public figure libel plaintiff. But state discretion over libel
laws should not include tampering with an actual malice test the
Supreme Court has determined must remain under federal consti-
tutional standards.
In Pennsylvania, there have been some developments in the
clarity" that [the] statement was capable of defamatory meaning. This is the stan-
dard enunciated in New York Times v. Sullivan, for proof of actual malice required
of a public figure. Without deciding whether the evidence of defamatory content
should be measured by that standard or one less stringent, we are satisfied that Chuy
failed to prove defamation.
Id.
118. The Supreme Court often counsels self-restraint by suggesting that judges decide
cases on as narrow grounds as possible, avoiding formulating a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. See Justice Bran-
deis' famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288
(1936).
119. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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public figure/private person area which are accommodating to first
amendment interests. A decision that has had some impact within
the state and has been cited by other state courts as well is Steaks
Unlimited v. Deaner.120 Decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1980, the case examined the ques-
tion of whether a business can be considered a public figure for the
purposes of a libel suit.
A consumer reporter for a Pittsburgh television station did a se-
ries of reports on a retail meat company, alleging that the company
was engaged in fraudulent activities including misrepresenting the
price and quality of its product. A central issue in determining
that the company would be considered a public figure in its suit
against the television station and the reporter was that it had ad-
vertised in the area. The company's advertisements were featured
on radio and in newspapers, and the company erected large signs
and distributed handbills. The advertising campaign cost more
than $16,000.121
The trial court had granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the company was a public figure and
had failed to provide evidence of actual malice. The court of ap-
peals in Steaks Unlimited undertook a detailed examination of the
Supreme Court's efforts to define public figures. The court under-
stood Gertz to mean that there were three classes of public figures:
those who became public figures through no purposeful action of
their own, although they recognized that the instances of truly in-
voluntary public figures would be "exceedingly rare;" those who
occupy such power and influence that they are public figures for all
purposes; and the more common situation where they have thrust
themselves to the forefront of a public controversy to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. In such a situation, the public
figures invite attention and comment. 
22
Public figures, in the view of the court of appeals, are distin-
guished by their greater access to channels of communication in
order to counteract false statements; and they are "less deserving
of [judicial] protection because they have, 'voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
120. 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). The vulnerability of broadcasting to libel suits is
partially related to its "second-rate" first amendment status. See also R.E. LABUNSKI, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION (1982).
121. 623 F.2d at 267.
122. Id. at 273.
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concerning them.' "12" In the words of the court of appeals, "public
figures effectively have assumed the risk of potentially unfair criti-
cism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public's
attention.'
124
In the opinion of the court of appeals, Steaks Unlimited as-
sumed such a risk by advertising:
Steaks is not a public figure in the general sense of the term. . . . There is
nothing in the record here to indicate that Steaks is famous or widely in-
volved in public affairs. . . . There is uncontroverted evidence, however,
that Steaks so thrust itself into the purview of the Pittsburgh area public
that the company can be characterized as a public figure for purposes of the
controversy giving rise to this litigation.
12 5
The court also noted that because Steaks Unlimited was able to
purchase advertising time, it also possessed regular and continuing
access to channels of communication. If the company had desired,
it could have purchased additional advertising time to respond to
or refute the charges made by the television station. The court of
appeals agreed with the district court that the company, through
its advertising campaign, had "voluntarily injected itself into a
matter of public interest-indeed, it appears to have created a con-
troversy-for the purpose of influencing the consuming public. In
short . . . Steaks invited public attention, comment and criti-
cism."1 2 6 The judgment of the district court was sustained.
Such a ruling obviously encourages news organizations to ex-
amine product and advertising claims of private businesses. Yet,
the court seemed to suggest that the size of the company's adver-
tising budget will be a factor in determining whether it is consid-
ered a public or a private figure. There is the implication that a
company that spends less on advertising or whose advertising cam-
paign is less effective would be considered a private individual.
VII. LIBEL PLAINTIFFS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Journalists rely heavily on summary judgments in protecting
themselves against frivolous libel suits brought by plaintiffs who
may not have suffered actual injury as a result of irresponsible re-
porting, but who are unhappy with the way they have been por-
trayed in media coverage. When media defendants win summary
123. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 274.
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dismissal, they are spared the substantial time and financial com-
mitment of defending the suit at trial and often through the ap-
peal process. How often and under what circumstances judges
grant summary dismissals in libel actions is a question of much
importance. Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to their day in
court; journalists claim that many libel suits are brought to harass
them, so that those without merit must be quickly dismissed.
The Libel Defense Resource Center, which gathers statistics on
libel cases from around the country, concluded in a study covering
the period from 1980 to 1984 that cases are much more likely to be
dismissed on a motion by the defendant for summary judgment if
the plaintiff has to prove actual malice. In a survey that covered
250 summary judgment motions, the LDRC study found that the
success rate of the defendants seeking summary dismissal was
eighty percent in cases where actual malice was the standard and
sixty-five percent in cases where negligence was the issue.
127
Of the 136 cases involving private persons, in only three was the
issue of negligence dispositive on the motion for summary judg-
ment. In all. three cases, the motion was denied. 12 The LDRC
study recognized that the sample of summary judgment motions in
the cases where a standard other than actual malice applied is very
small, but the study claimed that too is relevant:
Indeed, the paucity of motions may well itself be indicative of the signifi-
cance of the choice of standard on pre-trial motion practice-suggesting
that fewer defendants will even attempt to seek summary judgment where
lesser standards of fault apply and, where sought, fewer such motions will
be granted. Most courts consider negligence to be peculiarly a question of
fact appropriate for resolution by a jury and not by the court. On the other
hand, the far more demanding standard of fault in actual malice cases-and
the higher clear and convincing evidentiary burden-have kept the success
rate on summary judgment in actual malice cases high, despite footnote 9 of
Hutchinson v. Proxmire.
12 9
In Pennsylvania, there has been an attitude on the part of some
judges that summary judgment ought not to be granted hastily, on
the assumption that a libel plaintiff is entitled to present evidence
to a jury. In Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers,5 0 decided by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1981, Justice Roberts seemed to
127. 12 LDRC Bulletin at 7 (December 31, 1984).
128. Id.
129. The LDRC study actually covered two two-year periods, 1980-82 and 1982-84.
This quote is from the previous study covering the 1980-82 period. 6 LDRC Bulletin at 35
(March 15, 1983).
130. 497 Pa. 163, 439 A.2d 652 (1981).
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suggest that summary judgment should be granted not only when
the plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that a jury should con-
sider, but when it is almost a certainty that the plaintiff would lose
at trial.13 ' Quoting a series of cases, Justice Roberts outlined the
circumstances under which summary judgment should be
considered:
Summary judgment is granted only in the clearest of cases, where the right
is clear and free from doubt. . . .The moving party has the burden of prov-
ing the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact. . . .All doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the
moving party." 2
In Curran, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went so far as to
say that a judge should be careful in accepting the testimony of
those seeking a summary judgment that there is no actionable
question which a jury should decide; and it warned against depriv-
ing a jury of the chance to hear the case, particularly since a jury
should be able to assess the credibility of testimony.'
More than fifty years ago in Nanty-Glo Borough v. American
Surety Company,13 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated its
determination to let questions of fact get to a jury: "[H]owever
clear and indisputable may be the proof when it depends on oral
testimony, it is nevertheless the province of the jury to decide...
as to the law applicable to the facts."'3 5
In the wake of the Supreme Court's rulings in libel, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Curran had to decide if the Nanty-Glo
rule was consistent with the constitutional privileges discussed in
New York Times v. Sullivan, St. Amant v. Thompson,3 6 and
Chief Justice Burger's suggestion in footnote nine in Hutchinson v.
131. Id. at 177, 439 A.2d at 659 (quoting Bremmer v. Protected Home Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 436 Pa. 494, 496-97, 260 A.2d 785, 786 (1970)), that:
Summary judgment is proper 'only if the evidence then before the court is such as
would warrant the granting of a defendant's point for binding instructions after trial.'
497 Pa. at 177, 439 A.2d at 659.
132. Id. at 177-78, 439 A.2d at 659. (specific case references omitted).
133. Id. at 183, 439 A.2d at 662. In pertinent part, the court held that:
[T]estimonial affidavits of the moving party or his witnesses, not documentary, even
if uncontradicted, will not afford sufficient basis for the entry of summary judgment,
since the credibility of the testimony is still a matter for the jury .... That trial by
testimonial affidavit is prohibited "cannot be emphasized too strongly."
Id.
134. 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932).
135. 497 Pa. at 184, 439 A.2d at 662. (quoted with approval in Curran).
136. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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Proxmire.'87 The court was convinced that the rule was still good
law: "We are satisfied that the case law of the Supreme-Court of
the United States supports our adherence to the Nanty-Glo rule in
this controversy over the existence of actual malice. 1' 38 The court
then cited Chief Justice Burger's footnote expressing doubt about
a rule favoring summary judgment in determining whether a plain-
tiff had demonstrated actual malice, proof of which calls a defend-
ant's state of mind into question and does not, in the view of the
Supreme Court, readily lend itself to summary disposition. To the
Pennsylvania court, St. Amant provided even more justification for
limiting the use of summary judgment: "More significant, in St.
Amant v. Thompson, the Supreme Court specifically stated that
the defendant in a defamation action cannot insure a favorable
verdict 'by testifying that he published with a belief that the state-
ments were true.'-18
Thus, Pennsylvania's Nanty-Glo rule, in the view of its highest
court, can be derived "directly from the language of the Supreme
Court." The language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
seem to indicate that the granting of summary judgment on behalf
of a media defendant in a libel case would be the exception and
not the rule.
Despite this apparently strict interpretation, Pennsylvania
courts do grant summary judgment dismissals requested by media
defendants. In fact, in Curran, the very case in which Justice Rob-
erts described Pennsylvania law on the subject, a grant of sum-
mary judgment by the court of common pleas was sustained, al-
though in the other libel action in the case it was reversed and the
case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
14 0
Summary judgment motions have been granted in a number of
other Pennsylvania cases in recent years. In Brophy v. Philadel-
137. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). There was widespread concern among media organizations at
the time that Chief Justice Burger's footnote would make it more difficult for judges to
grant summary judgment for media defendants. The trial judge in Hutchinson had said that
in cases involving actual malice, summary judgment "might well be the rule rather than the
exception." But Chief Justice Burger warned lower courts not to be hasty: "Considering the
nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-
called 'rule.' The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question and
does not readily lend itself to summary disposition." 443 U.S. at 120 n.9. The footnote has
apparently not greatly reduced the number of summary dismissals awarded to media de-
fendants. See 12 LDRC Bulletin (December 31, 1984).
138. 497 Pa. at 163, 439 A.2d at 652.
139. 390 U.S. at 732 (cited with approval, 497 Pa. at 184-85, 439 A.2d at 662).
140. 497 Pa. at 167, 439 A.2d at 654.
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phia Newspapers, 14 for example, decided by the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court in 1980, the court sustained a dismissal by summary
judgment requested by a newspaper and granted by the trial court.
The Superior Court recognized the many precedents for not grant-
ing summary judgment and, in fact, said that many of those argu-
ments were persuasive. But in the Brophy case, involving police
officers who would have to meet the actual malice standard, there
was, in the view of the court, no evidence of actual malice or delib-
erate falsification and, therefore, summary judgment was
sustained.
142
But in Marcone v. Penthouse, discussed above, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
fused to grant a motion for summary judgment. The refusal was on
the grounds that the plaintiff was not a public figure for the pur-
poses of the present case, and "is not entitled to summary judg-
ment on the ground that Mr. Marcone is a public figure who can-
not produce evidence of malice as required of public figures by
New York Times and Gertz.' ' 3
VIII. PENNSYLVANIA'S SHIELD LAW IN LIBEL SUITS
Whatever criticism the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit deserves by those concerned about the first amend-
ment, it must be commended for its decision in Steaks Unlimited
in another area of the law. The trial judge had denied a motion by
Steaks Unlimited demanding outtakes on the grounds that such
materials were protected by the Pennsylvania Shield Law.1" The
court defined outtakes as "nonconfidential material, filmed or re-
corded in preparation for the ... report, but not included in the
broadcast.""1
45
The company claimed in its appeal that the outtakes were not
protected by the shield law and that they would reveal that the
television station had omitted from the broadcast material
favorable to Steaks Unlimited. The company claimed that the out-
takes would be relevant to the question whether the defendants
had acted with "knowing or reckless disregard of the truth." The
141. 281 Pa. Super. 588, 422 A.2d 625 (1980).
142. Id. at 603, 422 A.2d at 633.
143. 533 F. Supp. at 360. Penthouse had argued for summary judgment on other
grounds as well, such as fair reporting of judicial proceedings, which the court rejected.
144. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Supp. 1979). See supra note 41 and accompany-
ing text.
145. 623 F.2d at 277 n.60.
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television station admitted that the outtakes contained relevant in-
formation, but argued that the Commonwealth through its shield
law had chosen to "deny litigants access to materials that might
reveal a source of information."146
The court noted that comparing the broadcast material with ma-
terial that was in the defendant's possession but omitted is proba-
bly the most common way of proving that the defendants acted
with actual malice. "The jury is asked to infer from such a compar-
ison that the defendants acted with subjective doubts about the
truthfulness of their publication." 17
Yet, the court was convinced that the Pennsylvania courts had
granted broad application of the shield law in a number of cases
and the trial court's refusal to order the outtakes turned over to
the company was correct. ' 8 The television station had claimed
that if it were forced to turn over the outtakes, sources to whom
confidentiality had been promised would be revealed. There was,
however, a more perplexing problem for the court. The television
station also sought to protect additional portions of an interview
with the primary sources. Because some portions had been used,
the primary source was known and viewing the outtakes would not
reveal the identity of the source. Nevertheless, the court held that
the seminal case on the shield law, In re Taylor, protects those
outtakes as well. The court expressed concern that even though the
primary source was known, the outtakes may have revealed sec-
ondary sources. 49
While the court of appeals had little discretion in the face of the
Pennsylvania courts' strong endorsement of the shield law, it is re-
assuring to those concerned about the ability of media organiza-
tions to do investigative stories that a United States Court of Ap-
146. Id. at 277.
147. Id. at 277 n.62.
148. See In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, 3 D. & C. 3d 693 (1977). In Steaks Unlimited, the court rejected the defendants' argu-
ment that Herbert v. Lando required that the television station turn over the outtakes:
The [Supreme] Court did not hold . . . that it is unconstitutional for the states to
establish a privilege against state-of-mind discovery. The Constitution has never been
construed as requiring the states to provide persons or organizations who have been
defamed with a remedy for their injuries. It follows that, to the extent a state chooses
to authorize a cause of action for defamation, it may also limit the plaintiff's ability
to prove his claim in order to promote other social purposes. Therefore, Pennsylva-
nia's shield statute, adopted for the purpose of fostering freedom of the press, is not
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis in Herbert.
623 F.2d at 279 n.74.
149. Id. at 279.
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peals has placed into law such a strong statement on the rights of
journalists to keep confidential the names of sources.1 50 In a num-
ber of recent cases around the nation, judges have ordered journal-
ists who are defendants in libel suits to reveal the names of sources
even if confidentiality had been offered to the source; when they
refused, the judges have instructed the juries to assume no source
existed. In one case, the judge entered a default judgment for the
plaintiff when a newspaper reporter refused to identify a source."'
While the holding of the Third Circuit may be limited because it
was interpreting a state shield law and strong state court endorse-
ment of it, it is nevertheless a case that favors first amendment
interests.
The question of the applicability of the Steaks Unlimited deci-
sion is related to the issue of jurisdiction, a problem that arises
when plaintiffs sue media defendants who circulate newspapers
and newscasts across state lines. 152 The television station in Steaks
Unlimited, WTAE-TV, is licensed in Pittsburgh and serves the
Pittsburgh area including portions of Eastern Ohio. Steaks Unlim-
ited was incorporated and maintained its principle place of busi-
ness in Ohio but was, in this case, selling meat at department
stores in the Pittsburgh area.
150. See 13 LDRC Bulletin at 9-10 (March 31, 1985). See also Smith, News-source
Privilege in Libel Cases: A Critical Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 349-71 (1982).
151. One of the Americans taken hostage in Iran, Jerry Plotkin, sued the Daily News
in Los Angeles after it quoted "federal law enforcement officials" as saying that he faced
questioning about drug smuggling. Plotkin, who was not charged with any criminal offense,
demanded to know the identity of the sources for the articles, which were published on
January 21, 1981. According to the New York Times, Judge Sara Radin, in pretrial actions,
told the reporters to identify their sources. When they refused, she granted a default judg-
ment, meaning Plotkin, who had sued the newspaper for $60 million, won the lawsuit.
In a most interesting development, the parent company of the Daily News, the Tribune
Company of Chicago, ordered the reporters who wrote the story to disclose their sources.
According to the Times, it argued that the survival of the paper outweighed the reporters'
promise to protect their informants. The judge eventually reversed the default judgment
and allowed the case to be tried. The reporters eventually persuaded their sources, two offi-
cials of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency, to allow themselves to be identified. Another
judge ruled later that the two officials would be allowed to testify. Friendly, Reporters Who
Hid Identity Of Sources Win Libel Ruling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1984, at B9.
152. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for examples of jurisdictional issues
being decided against media defendants. See also Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381-440
(1985); Malloy, Personal Jurisdiction Over Publishers in Defamation Actions: A Current
Assessment, 30 VILL. L. REV. 193-226 (1985); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over a Non-resi-
dent Defendant-Minimum Contacts Rule in Libel Suits, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 513-26 (1985);
and Note, Constitutional Law-Consistency in the Due Process Requirement? 18 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 125-50 (1985).
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The district court and court of appeals heard the case in their
diversity jurisdiction. Because both parties to the case agreed that
Pennsylvania law governed the substantive issue, the courts had no
reason to challenge that agreement:
Inasmuch as Pennsylvania has an interest in the outcome of this litiga-
tion-the allegedly defamatory acts as well as the subject of the disputed
broadcast occurred in Pennsylvania-there is no cause for this Court sua
sponte, to challenge the parties' consensual choice of law. Accordingly, we
turn to the determination of how a Pennsylvania court would be expected to
resolve the substantive questions presented by this appeal.1
5 3
Interestingly, if the case had been tried under Ohio and not
Pennsylvania law, the issue of the outtakes might have been de-
cided differently. In Ohio v. Geis,154 the state court of appeals for
Franklin County recognized the importance of protecting sources,
as expressed by Ohio's shield law, but it was also concerned about
other societal interests such as those discussed in Branzburg v.
Hayes' 55 by the Supreme Court. In Geis, the court would have or-
dered an in camera inspection by the judge to determine whether
the evidence requested by the defendant was admissible and rele-
vant. That way, in the view of the court, the identity of the source
would be protected.156 But some journalists, such as Myron Farber
of the New York Times, feel that even an inspection by the judge
in his chambers of notes or materials that would reveal the identity
of sources is not permissible under shield laws.1 57 To its credit, the
Ohio appeals court in Geis reversed the trial court's decision that
the television station in Columbus had waived any right to protect
outtakes by airing portions of the interview. 58
There are many other areas of the law that have been left to the
discretion of the states, and a brief review indicates that Pennsyl-
vania's standards do not vary widely from those of other states.
Pennsylvania has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Section 559), which provides a definition of defamatory communi-
cation. In Merton Center v. Rockwell International,159 the Penn-
153. 623 F.2d at 269-70.
154. 2 Ohio App.3d 258, 441 N.E.2d 803 (1981).
155. 408 U.S. 655 (1972).
156. 2 Ohio App.3d at 264, 441 N.E.2d at 807.
157. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978). See also Note,
Torts-Defamation-New Jersey Shield Law Provides Newspersons an Absolute Privilege
Protecting Editorial Processes and Confidential Sources from Discovery in a Defamation
Action, 28 VILL. L. REv. 225-52 (1982).
158. 2 Ohio App.3d at 267, 441 N.E.2d at 809.
159. 497 Pa. 460, 442 A.2d 213 (1981).
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sylvania Supreme Court quoted the standard used by state courts,
which was that "a communication is defamatory if it tends so to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third parties from associating or
dealing with him.
'1 60
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made it clear, in Merton and
in other cases, that it is up to the trial judge to make an initial
determination of whether the challenged statement is capable of
defamatory meaning. If the trial court decides the words are not
capable of such meaning, "there is no basis for the matter to pro-
ceed to trial. ' 161 If the court finds that the communication is capa-
ble of defamatory meaning, "it is for the jury to determine whether
it was so understood by the recipient."' 62
Many states, including Pennsylvania, had "malice" components
in their libel laws before the Supreme Court changed the term
malice from the traditional meaning, usually described as ill-will or
spite, to the standard adopted in New York Times and extended in
Butts and Walker. It has been difficult for Pennsylvania, as it
probably has been for other states, to synthesize state statutes and
court decisions relating to malice with the new Supreme Court
standards. For example, Pennsylvania law provided, as did the law
of most states, that a cause of action for defamation is "implied or
presumed to exist from the unprivileged publication of defamatory
words actionable per se.' 163 But in Gertz, the Supreme Court
struck down state laws that allowed "presumed" damages where
the statements were libelous per se, and thus called into question
the continued validity of distinguishing between defamation per se
and statements not defamatory on their face.
Pennsylvania allowed an exception to the libel per se rule if the
published material furthered "[s]ome interest of social importance,
which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompen-
sated harm to the plaintiff's reputation."'64 Even though this state-
ment was made some years before Butts, Walker and Rosenbloom,
it seems to combine many of their elements. In fact, the court of
appeals in Steaks Unlimited noted Pennsylvania's ability to com-
160. Id. at 464, 442 A.2d at 215.
161. Id. at 464-65, 442 A.2d at 215-16.
162. Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d at 270.
163. Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. at 451, 273 A.2d at 909 (emphasis in
original).
164. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. at 181, 140 A.2d at 102 (quoted in
Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d at 271).
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bine state standards with first amendment requirements:
Pennsylvania courts have tended to look for guidance to the First Amend-
ment decisions of the United States Supreme Court . . .Pennsylvania cases
do not distinguish precisely between the common law basis for recovery and
the limitations placed on such tort claims by the First Amendment.' 5
In a case decided by the same court two years earlier, the court of
appeals recognized how difficult it is to tell where common law
ends and constitutional law begins:
[E]ven though in analyzing this case we start with Pennsylvania tort law, no
rigid line of demarcation may be maintained between state law rules and
constitutional norms, for both are intermixed in the Pennsylvania
precedents.' 6
Judges, constitutional scholars and others have noted that it is
these characteristics that make libel law so perplexing. Few areas
of the law are as complex as libel, where courts try to combine
modern first amendment principles with common law precedents,
some of which have been on the books for many years. Trying to
separate state law issues from constitutional standards has proved
to be difficult; attempting to combine them and apply them in the
context of modern mass media has not proved to be much easier.
IX. CONCLUSION
If Pennsylvania has become the libel capital of the nation, it is a
dubious honor. Public officials, undaunted by the actual malice
test, and private persons who need to prove only negligence, sue
media organizations there at a frenzied pace.16 Media defendants
often find Pennsylvania courtrooms to be hostile environments in
which to press first amendment claims.
This article has suggested that states may settle many issues in
the post-Gertz era. Pennsylvania has answered only some of those
questions, while other issues remain less settled: Is it now as clear
as can be who will be a public figure and who will be a private
person in libel suits? If Pennsylvania courts are applying a "cov-
ert" public interest test, will the nature of the controversy, rather
than just the actions of the plaintiff, continue to be an important
factor?
Now that the Supreme Court has resolved the question of bur-
165. Id.
166. Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d at 502.
167. See 12 LDRC Bulletin (December 31, 1984) and 13 LDRC Bulletin (March 31,
1985) for other examples of libel suits involving news organizations in Pennsylvania.
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den of proof in Hepps for cases involving private persons, must it
also consider the level of proof that is appropriate in cases involv-
ing public officials and public figures? Will such plaintiffs in Penn-
sylvania and other states have to prove actual malice by "convinc-
ing clarity" or "preponderance of evidence?" Also, under what
circumstances can media defendants reasonably expect summary
dismissal?
In this era of legal "decentralization," states have been granted
substantial autonomy to interpret what had previously been con-
sidered federal rights. States have reacted to such independence by
relying more directly on their own constitutions, and by interpret-
ing vague federal constitutional provisions in a way that conforms
more with state and local standards. States know that the Supreme
Court, with a crushing case load of its own, is willing to allow state
experimentation in areas that previously required uniform national
standards.
Such decentralization of the legal system may mean greater pro-
tection of fundamental rights, such as those of the first amend-
ment, in states more committed to such principles; it may also
mean a narrowing of such precious rights in states where reputa-
tion is considered to be on nearly equal footing with first amend-
ment interests. 168
Pennsylvania's experience in libel and the standards developed
by its courts may or may not be representative of those of other
states in this vital area of the law. But as more states react to Su-
preme Court libel decisions in this era of decentralization, it is
likely that the first amendment is going to mean one thing in one
state, and something very different in another.
168. For a discussion of the "preferred position" theory of the first amendment, see
LABUNSKI, supra note 3.
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